This paper also makes a methodological contribution to the estimation of network regressions. We clarify the identi…cation issues raised by dyadic regressions -that is, regressions in which each observation expresses a relationship between pairs of nodes. We also extend the concept of robust standard errors to dyadic regressions, thereby providing an easy alternative to network inference methods based on permutations or generalized least squares.
I. Econometric issues
We estimate a reduced-form regression of the form:
where L ij denotes the existence of a link between individuals i and j and d ij represents the distance between i and j. The bene…ts and costs of the link are denoted B(d ij ) and C(d ij ), respectively; e ij is a residual e¤ect. A link is established if bene…ts exceed costs.
Bene…ts from pooling income risk fall as incomes are more correlated. We expect B(d ij ) to rise with d ij if income shocks are less correlated the more di¤erent individuals are. Because of information asymmetries and enforcement issues, C(d ij ) is likely to increase with distance. People may also …nd it di¢ cult to ascertain the income shocks faced by those with di¤erent income streams. It is thus unclear whether individuals establish links with people who are in the best position to pool income risk.
Estimating equation (I.1) is the main objective of this paper. Equation (I.1) is a dyadic regression model. The estimation of dyadic regressions raises two types of di¢ culties: identi…cation, and inference. The …rst problem relates to the form in which regressors enter the regression. The second relates to the estimation of standard errors. We discuss these in turn.
Dyadic regressors come in two forms: attributes w ij of the link between i and j, such as the geographical distance between them, and attributes z i and z j of individuals i and j. Regressors must enter a dyadic regression in a symmetric fashion so that the e¤ect of (z i ; z j ) on Y ij is the same as the e¤ect of (z j ; z i ) on Y ji . Dyadic regressions must therefore be written in a way that preserves this symmetry. How this is accomplished depends on whether the dyadic relationship is directional or not.
A dyadic relationship is undirectional if Y ji = Y ij for all i; j. In this case, symmetry requires that regressors satisfy X ij = X ji . One easy way of satisfying this requirement is to specify the regression as: Dyadic observations are not independent since E[u ij ; u ik ] 6 = 0 for all i and E[u ij ; u kj ] 6 = 0 for all j.
We also have E[u ij ; u jk ] 6 = 0 and E[u ij ; u ki ] 6 = 0. Provided that regressors are exogenous, applying OLS to (I.2) and (I.3) yields consistent coe¢ cient estimates but standard errors are inconsistent. To obtain consistent standard errors, we extend the method that Timothy J. Conley developed to deal with spatial correlation of errors:
where denotes the vector of coe¢ cients, N is the number of dyadic observations, K is the number of regressors, X is the matrix of all regressors, X ij is the vector of regressors for dyadic observation ij, and m ijkl = 1 if i = k; j = l; i = l or j = k, and 0 otherwise. 1 Formula (I.4) also corrects for possible heteroskedasticity.
II. Empirical results
The empirical analysis is based on a survey conducted in northern Philippines speci…cally to study risk sharing networks (Susan Lund, 1996) . Sampled households derive most of their income from non-farm activities (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003) .
At the beginning of the survey, each household was asked to identify four individuals on which it could rely in case of need. Most of these individuals are close family members residing in the same village. They constitute the network of insurance partners of each household. Approximately 939 network members were identi…ed by respondents, of which 189 are in households covered by the survey. In subsequent three survey rounds, detailed information was collected on income shocks and all loans and gifts between households. Loan repayment information was also gathered.
Using these data, Fafchamps and Lund (2003) have shown that new loans and gifts play a risk mitigating role. Fafchamps and Gubert (2002) show that loan repayment is contingent on shocks faced by the borrower. Here we examine the structure of risk sharing networks. We begin by estimating equation (I.1). Dependent variable L ij is 1 if household i cites household j as a source of assistance, 0 otherwise. Since i can cite j without j citing i, L ij is directional.
Regressors include income correlation and various measures of geographical and social distance. To control for possible endogeneity, we instrument income correlation using the occupation status of various household members as measured at the beginning of the survey -see Fafchamps and Gubert (2006) for details. 2 Geographical distance is measured by two variables: whether both households i and j reside in the same hamlet or sitio; and the di¤erence between i's and j's distance to the nearest road, provided they reside in the same sitio. Other dimensions of social distance are included as additional controls, such as occupation, household size, age, health, education, and wealth. 1 By construction, all observations where j = i or k = l are identically zero and hence are omitted. Division of the inner term by 2 corrects for the double counting implied by the simple way we have written the formula.
2 Income include earnings from jobs held in the last three months, unearned incomes received in the last three months, and earnings from the sale of crops and livestock in the last three months.
3 Wealth is also instrumented, using birthplace, number of siblings, and inherited wealth.
Results are shown in Table 1 . 4 Income correlation has the wrong sign and is not statistically signi…cant.
The same conclusion holds for di¤erences in occupation, health, and household composition. Surveyed households do not therefore appear to establish risk sharing links with those in the best position to pool income risk. In contrast, geographical proximity is strongly signi…cant. We also …nd that respondents cite as source of mutual insurance households that are on average older and richer than themselves.
These results could be misleading if L ij has little or no relationship with actual risk sharing. To eliminate this possibility, we need to show that reported links play a role in the sharing of risk. From the work of Fafchamps and Lund (2003) we know that in the study area gifts and loans serve a risk sharing purpose. We thus estimate a model of the form:
where G t ij denotes the value of all gifts (or loans) received by i from j in survey rounds t = 2 and t = 3.
Variables z i and w ij are as in Results for gifts and informal loans are reported in Table 2 . Geographical proximity variables are strongly signi…cant in both regressions, con…rming earlier results. The existence of a link is associated with gifts to unhealthy individuals that are 200 times larger than without a link. Loans from non-farmers to farmers are 27 times larger with a link. These results demonstrate that reported links L ij are not irrelevant.
Results so far emphasize the importance of geographical proximity. Could it be that proximity mitigates moral hazard? In the survey area, loans between friends and relatives are granted without specifying a due date. The borrower is expected to exert diligence but repayment may be delayed in case of shock (Fafchamps and Gubert, 2002) . As distance increases, monitoring becomes more di¢ cult. This generates moral hazard and may explain why risk sharing takes place primarily among nearby households.
To investigate this issue, we estimate a duration model in which the dependent variable is the time elapsed until a loan is repaid and we test whether informal loans between nearby households are repaid faster. As in Fafchamps and Gubert (2002), we control for shocks, loan size, interest charges, and partial repayment. Household characteristics and village dummies are included as well. Results presented in Table 3 show that informal loans between distant households are paid less rapidly. This is consistent with the existence of moral hazard and may in turn explain why proximity plays such a paramount role in the formation of risk sharing networks.
III. Conclusion
We have examined the determinants of risk sharing links between households. We found that geographic proximity is a major determinant of such links. In contrast, occupation and income correlation are not signi…cant determinants of network links. We also …nd that reported network links have a strong e¤ect on subsequent gifts and loans and that geographical proximity is associated with faster repayment of informal loans. Taken together our …ndings suggest that surveyed households do not form links that maximize potential gains from pooling income risk, perhaps because of moral hazard considerations.
Two caveats must be made. First, we were unable to control for family relationships because we do not have the necessary data. But from anthropological accounts, in the study area we know that kinship is correlated with geographical proximity. Results relative to geographical proximity should be interpreted in this light. Second, links with network links with individuals outside the four surveyed villages were not included in the analysis since the focus was on intra-village risk sharing. From the literature on migrations, we nevertheless know that links with migrants play an important role in diversifying income risk across space and occupations. Close kinship with migrants probably serves as a substitute for direct monitoring.
This paper also makes a methodological contribution to the burgeoning empirical literature on economic networks. First we clari…ed identi…cation issues in dyadic data, especially with respect to directed networks and degree distribution. Second we facilitated inference on network processes by applying the well-known concept of robust standard errors to dyadic data. Estimator is least squares. All t-values based on standard errors corrected for dyadic correlation of errors.
(a) Dependent variable in log(value of gift or loan +1); (b) instrumented --see text for details. Estimator is a duration model.
